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PARENTS, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS, AND PUBLIC
SCHOOL CURRICULA

Mark Strasser*

I.

INTRODUCTION

More and more states are recognizing same-sex marriage
and civil unions. Further, the Federal Defense of Marriage Act
may no longer be the law of the land in the not-too-distant
future. 1 The growing acceptance of lesbian, gay, bisexual and
trans gender
(LG BT)
families
represented
by
these
developments may have a variety of implications, for example,
some teachers and school boards may feel increased pressure to
modify their public school curricula to keep abreast of some of
these changes in public opinion and include references to LGBT
families during the school day.
Commentators suggest that some with religious views
opposing same-sex marriage will not welcome such changes in
school curricula. While that may be so, faith-based opposition
by religious parents would not alone justify the exclusion of
such references during the school day. If a rule were adopted
precluding school children from being exposed to anything that
might be thought to undermine someone's religious beliefs and
values, then schoolchildren would be exposed to very little.
Certainly, it is by no means easy to achieve a balance
between developing curricula on the one hand and respecting
the sincere religious and moral concerns of parents on the
other, especially given the great variation in moral and
religious belief in our country. Yet, if children are going to
learn about and be prepared for the world in which they live,
then they must be taught about individuals who may be unlike

*Trustees Professor of Law, Capital University Law School, Columbus, Ohio.
1. See, e.g, Mass. v. U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Servs., 698 F. Supp. 2d
2:H (D. Mass. 2010) (striking down the Defense of Marriage Act provision defining
marriage for federal purposes).

547

548

B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL

[2011

themselves. This article discusses the inclusion of LGBT
families in public school curricula, focusing on two cases that
illustrate some of the difficulties posed for schools seeking to
educate the students in their care when parents assert that the
curriculum is undercutting their sincerely held religious
convictions.

II.

SCHOOL CURRICULA AND CONTROVERSIAL MATERIALS

Over the past few decades, parents have challenged the
kinds of curricula offered in the public schools, claiming that
the introduction of certain topics contravenes their religious
convictions. Sometimes, parents seek to have their children
exempted from instruction or discussions involving certain
issues, which may impose more of a burden on the schools than
might initially be apparent. Two cases-Mozert v. Hawkins
County Board of Education 2 and Parker v. Hurley 3-illustrate
some of the difficult issues that must be confronted when
parents feel that their religious beliefs and values are
threatened by the subject matters taught in the public school
classroom.

A.

Mozert

Mozert is a seminal case, pitting a school system against
the right of parents to limit their children's exposure to ideas
not in accord with the parents' religious beliefs and values. The
Sixth Circuit examined whether "a public school requirement
that all students in grades one through eight use a prescribed
set of reading textbooks violated the constitutional rights of
objecting parents and students."4 The parents suggested that
the books at issue contained material that undermined the
world view that they wished their children to have.
While the parents did not frame the issue in quite this way,
at least one of the problems posed was that the school system
taught "critical reading,'' 5 which required students to develop
"higher order cognitive skills that enable students to evaluate
the material they read, to contrast the ideas presented, and to

2.
3.
1.
5.

827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987).
511 F.3d 87 (1st Cir. 2008).
Mozert, 827 F.2d at 1059.
Id. at 1060.
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understand complex characters that appear in reading
material." 6 The parents did not challenge whether "critical
reading is an essential skill which ... children must develop in
order to succeed in other subjects and to function as effective
participants in modern society," 7 and instead focused on the
particular textbook choices made by the school board.
Nonetheless, the basic objection of at least some of the parents
was that the exposure of the children to certain concepts and
ways of looking at the world would itself undermine the
religious outlook that the parents wished their children to
have.x
Vicki Frost was the mother of four children, three of whom
were in the public schools in 1983. 9 Mrs. Frost found that
several of the themes included in the assigned reading were
troubling, such as the mental telepathy in one of the stories in
a sixth grade reader. 1 Further, after spending nearly 200
hours reviewing the series of books assigned in the schools, she
found numerous passages that were religiously offensive 11 -for
example, passages describing "Leonardo da Vinci as the human
with a creative mind that came closest to the divine touch" 12 or
advocating "the use of imagination as a vehicle for seeing
things not discernible through our physical eyes." 13 The Sixth
Circuit noted that there was a theme that was common to the
testimony of several of the objecting witnesses, namely, that
the "materials objected to 'could' be interpreted in a manner
repugnant to their religious beliefs." 14 Rather than take a
chance that the materials would be understood by their
children in a way contrary to faith, the parents wanted to make
sure that their children would not be exposed to these
potentially divisive ideas.
One parent, Bob Mozert, testified that he found certain
passages religiously offensive, because they dealt with "role

°

6. !d.
7. !d.
8. See infra notes 21-27 and accompanying text.
9. Mozert, 827 F.2d at 1060.
10. !d.
11. !d. at 1061. See also Fleischfresser v. Dirs. of Sch. Dist. 200, 15 F.3d 680, 683
(7th Cir. 1991) (detailing some of the reading topics that the parents believed would
undermine their religious beliefs).
12. Mozert, 827 F.2d at 1062.
13. !d.
11. !d.
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reversal or role elimination, particularly biographical material
about women who have been recognized for achievements
outside their homes." 15 He seemed worried that his children
might be led to misunderstand the "proper" roles of the sexes, 16
although the opinion did not specify the sexes of his children. 17
It might be noted that religious convictions do not always
mirror equal protection jurisprudence or public policy. For
example, the Supreme Court has emphasized the importance of
looking past "fixed notions concerning the roles and abilities of
males and females," 18 precisely because of the importance of
making legislative decisions based on "reasoned analysis rather
than through the mechanical application of traditional, often
inaccurate, assumptions about the proper roles of men and
women." 19 Nonetheless, some religious traditions suggest that
women as a general matter should take on the traditional role
of stay-at-home wife and mother.2°
Under cross examination, Mozert and Frost testified that
they "objected to passages that expose their children to other
forms of religion and to the feelings, attitudes and values of
other students that contradict the plaintiffs' religious views
without a statement that the other views are incorrect and that
the plaintiffs' views are the correct ones." 21 Basically, the
parents wanted to reduce the chances that their children would
be exposed to non-conforming beliefs and attitudes, although it
seems likely that the children would have some exposure to
different views just by virtue of being at a public school where
there might be children from a variety of backgrounds, who
might be living in any number of different family settings, and
might have a broad range of views about a variety of matters.

15. Jd.
16. Mozert was the father of a middle-school and an elementary school student.

See id.
17. He and his wife were the guardians ad litem for Travis and Sundee. see id. at
1058, which presumably means that they had a boy and a girl.
18. Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725 (1982).
19. !d. at 726.
20. See Linda C. McClain, The Domain of Civic Virtue in a Good Society:
Families, Schools, and Sex Equality, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1617, 164:3-44 (2001)
("Religious fundamentalism appears to have a significant effect on the preference for
this kind of patriarchal family, and conservative Christian views about women's proper
domestic roles as wife and mother appear to exert a significant effect on women's labor
force participation, such that 'fundamentalist women arc significantly more likely to
choose the home as their career in their early life course.'").
21. Mozert, 827 F.2d at 1062.
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The parents were not claiming that their children had been
forced to affirm ideas contrary to faith. 22 Had the children been
forced to do that, their constitutional rights would have been
violated. As the United States Supreme Court made clear long
ago, "if there is any fixed star in our constitutional
constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe
what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or
other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or
act their faith therein." 23 Rather, what was at issue here was
the parents' objection to the introduction of other people's
feelings, beliefs, and attitudes without an accompanying
suggestion that those views not coinciding with the parents'
views were incorrect.
Mrs. Frost did not argue that it would be unacceptable to
expose her children to other religions and philosophies at all. 24
Rather, she said that "if the practices of other religions were
described in detail, or if the philosophy was 'profound' in that it
expressed a world view that deeply undermined her religious
beliefs, then her children 'would have to be instructed to [the]
error [of the other philosophy]."' 25 However, the opportunities
for a profound disagreement were great, because Mrs. Frost's
own worldview provided a basis from which all situations and
beliefs should be judged, 26 which presumably meant that any
situation that might be discussed in the classroom would
potentially come in conflict with the view that she sincerely
held. Indeed, Mrs. Frost suggested that there were certain
topics, for example feminism, that simply could not be broached
without violating her beliefs. 27

22. ld. at 1 06a-61 ("The plaintiffs did not produce a single student or teacher to
testify that any student was ever required to atiirm his or her belief or disbelief in any
idea or practice mentioned in the various stories and passages contained in the Holt
series.").
28. West Ya. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, :319 U.S. 624, 642 (194a).
21. Mozert, 827 F.2d at 1061.
25. Jd.
26. Jd. ("The plaintiffs view every human situation and decision, whether related
to personal belief and conduct or to public policy and programs, from a theological or
religious perspective.").
27. Jd. ("She identified such themes as evolution, false supernaturalism,
feminism, telepathy and magic as matters that could not be presented in any way
without offending her beliefs.").
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As a separate matter, there was testimony that there was
too little discussion of Judea-Christian concepts in the class. 28
However, as the Sixth Circuit pointed out, changing the
balance of discussion might well have caused individuals of
other faiths to complain. 29 The court might have made a
further point. Even if there had been more discussion of "these
two dominant religions in the United States," 30 the plaintiff
might well have objected anyway, because the additional
discussion of these religions might have involved positions to
which she did not want her children exposed. For example, it
would not be surprising if she did not approve of increased
discussion of a religion that does not recognize the divinity of
Jesus Christ. Presumably, she also would not agree with views
that certain other Christians hold. 3 1 Indeed, the Sixth Circuit
noted that there was "evidence that other members of their
churches, and even their pastors, do not agree with their
position in this case." 32
The point should not be misunderstood. There is no
requirement for other members of one's faith to agree with
one's religious views in order for one's views to count as
religious. The United States Supreme Court has explained that
"the guarantee of free exercise is not limited to beliefs which
are shared by all of the members of a religious sect," 33
especially because "it is not within the judicial function and
judicial competence to inquire whether the petitioner or
[others] more correctly perceived the commands of their
common faith." 34 Thus, the point here is not that Mrs. Frost
and the other plaintiffs misunderstood their faith. Rather, it is
merely to point out that so much would potentially contradict
their views that it would be very difficult during the school day
to avoid everything that was objectionable, especially if part of

28. Id. at 1064-65 ("[P]laintiffs' expert witness, Dr. Vitz, . . . found 'markedly
little reference to religion, particularly Christianity, and also remarkably little to
Judaism' in the Holt series. His solution would be to 'beef up' the references to these
two dominant religions in the United States.").
29. I d. at 1065.
30. Id.
31. See, e.g., Naomi Cahn & June Carbone, Deep Purple: Religious Shades of
Family Law, 110 W.VA. L. REV. 159, 4 76 (2007) (discussing the liberal sexual views of
certain Christians).
32. Mozert, 827 F.2d at 1061.
33. Thomas v. Review Bd. of lnd. Emp't Sec. Div., 150 U.S. 707, 715-16 (1981).
34. ld. at 716.
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the program was designed to encourage critical reading,
thinking, and discussion throughout the school day. 35

Arguably, all the school was doing was exposing the children to
different viewpoints, 36 but even this might be objectionable to
the parents unless the divergent views were labeled as
incorrect. 37
One of the difficulties in understanding what was being
contested in Mozert was that there was some confusion about
what the parents believed their children were being taught.
The Sixth Circuit noted that "the plaintiffs appeared to assume
that materials clearly presented as poetry, fiction and even
'make-believe' in the Holt series were presented as facts, which
the students were required to believe," 38 although there was
absolutely nothing in the record to support that these materials
were presented that way. 39 One cannot tell whether the
parents would still have objected if they had understood that
the children were not being required, for example, to affirm the
truth of the make-believe materials. That said, however, when
a parent objects to in-depth discussions of alternative belief
systems and world views, 40 it does not seem plausible to believe
that her only worry is that her children might be forced to
make affirmations contrary to faith. After all, the teacher could
be careful to expose the children to several incompatible visions
of the world, such that it would be impossible for the children
to affirm all of the material presented. One infers that Mrs.
Frost, for example, would not have been satisfied had her
children been exposed to such a smorgasbord of ideas; on the

35. Mozert, 827 F.2d at 1072 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("This is particularly true
in grades one through four where reading is taught throughout the school day, rather
than in a particular period. Appellants would be unable to utilize effectively the critical
reading teaching method and accommodate appellees' religious beliefs.").
:36. !d. at 1069 ("The only conduct compelled hy the defendants was reading and
discussing the material in the Holt series, and hearing other students' interpretations
of those materials. This is the exposure to which the plaintiffs objected.").
37. See id. at 1062.
38. !d. at 1064. Cf. Fleischfresser v. Dirs. of Sch. Dist. 200, 15 F.3d 680, 688 (7th
Cir. 1991) ("'n addition, this 'religion' that is allegedly heing established seems for all
the world like a collection of exercises in 'make-believe' designed to develop and
encourage the use of imagination and reading skills in children that are the staple of
traditional public elementary school education.").
:39. Mozert, 827 F.2d at 1064.
40. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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contrary, it was the very variety of approaches that made her
worry. 41
One understanding of Mrs. Frost's concern was that the
exposure of her children to the different world views and to the
importance of critical thinking would themselves undermine
the approach that she was teaching her children to use. She
might say, for example, that in future when her children would
be confronted with something novel or contrary to what they
had been taught, she would not want them to try to analyze the
issue from a variety of perspectives or even use critical
thinking to reach some resolution. Instead, she would want
them to understand that all answers come from the correct
understanding of the Bible.
If understood in this way, Mrs. Frost's contention would be
reminiscent of the claims set forth in Wisconsin v. Yoder 42 that
the schooling would undermine the children's correct
understanding of the world. That case involved a Wisconsin
statute requiring students to attend public or private school
until age sixteen. 43 The Yoders did not want their children to
go to school beyond the eighth grade, 44 because they believed
that high school tends to emphasize intellectual and scientific
accomplishments, self-distinction, competitiveness, worldly
success, and social life with other students. Amish society
emphasizes informal learning-through-doing; a life of
"goodness," rather than a life of intellect; wisdom, rather than
technical knowledge, community welfare, rather than
competition; and separation from, rather than integration with,
contemporary worldly society. 45
The United States Supreme Court upheld the right of the
Yoders to withdraw their children from further formal
schooling once those children had finished the eighth grade. 46
Yet, the issue in Mozert was not whether the children could be
home-schooled or receive instruction in another setting where

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
406 U.S. 205 (1972).
Id. at 207.
See id.
Id. at 211.
Id. at 236.
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the parents' views were more likely to be supported47 but,
instead, whether the students could attend the school but
nonetheless be exempted from any discussions that might
undermine the plaintiffs' religious beliefs and values. 48
The Sixth Circuit suggested that "governmental actions
that merely offend or cast doubt on religious beliefs do not on
that account violate free exercise."49 The court drew a
distinction between "those governmental actions that actually
interfere with the exercise of religion and those that merely
require or result in exposure to attitudes and outlooks at odds
with perspectives prompted by religion." 50 If exposure to
different ideas were enough to constitute interference with
religious exercise, then many discussions of currents events
would almost necessarily interfere with someone's religious
exercise. 51
The Sixth Circuit held that the "requirement that public
school students study a basal reader series chosen by the school
authorities does not create an unconstitutional burden under
the Free Exercise Clause when the students are not required to
affirm or deny a belief or engage or refrain from engaging in a
practice prohibited or required by their religion." 52 The court
did not examine whether forcing the students to engage in
critical thinking and analysis might itself contradict the
religious views of the parents, since it was "not clear that the
plaintiffs object to all critical reading." 53 The court noted that
Mrs. Frost had merely said that "she did not want her children
to make critical judgments and exercise choices in areas where
the Bible provides the answer." 54 However, it was not as if
those areas of life to which Biblical teachings were applicable
were limited in number. On the contrary, "to the plaintiffs

47. See Mozert, 827 F.2d at 1060 ("Most of the plaintiff students were ultimately
taught at home, or attended religious schools, or transferred to public schools outside
Hawkins County.").
18. See id. at 1061.
19. !d. at 1068 (citing Grove v. Mead Sch. Dist. No. 351, 753 F.2d 1528, 1513 (9th
Cir. 1985) (Canby, J., concurring)).
50. ld. at 1068 (citing Grove, 75:1 F.2d at 1543 (Canby, J., concurring)).
51. !d. (noting that where the "free exercise clause violated whenever
governmental activity is offensive to or at variance with sincerely held religious
precepts, virtually no governmental program would be constitutionally possible.").
52. Jd. at 1070.
5:i. /d. at 1069 (emphasis added).
54. ld.
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there is but one acceptable view-the Biblical view, as they
interpret the Bible. Furthermore, the plaintiffs view every
human situation and decision, whether related to personal
belief and conduct or to public policy and programs, from a
theological or religious perspective." 55
Although "witnesses testified that reading the Holt series
'could' or 'might' lead the students to come to conclusions that
were contrary to teachings of their and their parents' religious
beliefs," 56 the Sixth Circuit was not persuaded that this mere
possibility was "sufficient to establish an unconstitutional
burden." 57 Yet, the court would likely not have been convinced
that an unconstitutional burden had been imposed even had a
stronger case been made that the curriculum was attitudechanging.
Suppose, for example, that evidence were offered that
students listening to discussions at school began to reject some
of the views of their parents. As long as the students were
deciding for themselves what to believe rather than were being
forced against their wills to accept some proposition, the state
would not have violated constitutional guarantees simply by
exposing the students to views that they ultimately found
persuasive. 58 Yet, if the important factor is whether the
student is deciding for herself what to believe, then the real
issue is not the relative degree of likelihood that the student
will reach unwelcome conclusions, which is what one might
have inferred from the court's highlighting that the student
"could" or "might" make certain judgments. Rather, the focus is
on whether the state is exposing the students to a variety of
ideas and then letting the students reach their own conclusions
rather than imposing certain beliefs on the students or coercing
the students into adopting or affirming certain views.
The Sixth Circuit did not address the substance of the
policy at issue. 59 Further, the court did not say that it would
have been impermissible to reach some compromise that would

55. Id. at 1064.
56. ld. at 1070.
57. ld.
58. See id. at 1068.
59. !d. at 1073 (Boggs, J., concurring) ("we make no judgment on the educational,
political or social soundness of the school board's decision to adopt this particular set of
books and this general curricular approach").
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have been more satisfactory to the parents. 60 Rather, the court
simply tried to flesh out what must be shown to establish that
the state is imposing too great of a burden on the religious
views of the parents and students. 61 Exposing children in a
public school setting to different worldviews and trying to
develop critical thinking skills within those children does not
constitute a violation of constitutional guarantees.
B. Parker

A little over twenty years after Mozert was decided, the
First Circuit was asked to address the kinds of
accommodations that a school must make for parents with
religious objections to some of the curriculum's content. In
Parker v. Hurley, 62 parents sued the Lexington, Massachusetts
school district because they wanted to be given the opportunity
to exempt their children from religiously repugnant books. 63
One set of parents, the Parkers, objected to a book given to
first-graders that included a discussion of diverse families
including families where both parents were of the same sex. 64
The other set of parents, the Wirthlins, objected to a second
grade teacher's reading to her class a book that depicted and
celebrated a same-sex marriage. 65 The parents did not
challenge the use of these books as part of a "nondiscrimination
curriculum in the public schools." 66 Instead, they wanted prior
notice about the materials that would be used in class and an
exemption from any instruction that they believed might be
contrary to faith, although they said that this would no longer
be necessary once their children reached the seventh grade. 67
As an initial matter, it is helpful to examine some of the
objectionable material. For example, Jacob, a kindergartener,

60. Cf id. (noting that at "the classroom level, the pupils and teachers in these
schools had in most cases reached a working accommodation").
61. ld. (noting that the case "is about the constitutional limits on the powers of
school boards to prescribe a curriculum").
62. Parker, 514 F.3d 87 (1st Cir. 2008).
63. /d. at 90.
64. !d. ("The Parkers object to their child being presented in kindergarten and
first grade with two hooks that portray diverse families, including families in which
both parents are of the same gender.").
65. ld. ("The Wirthlins object to a second-grade teacher's reading to their son's
class a book that depicts and celebrates a gay marriage.").
66. ld.
67. /d.
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brought home a "Diversity Book Bag" 6 g that included
depictions of different families including "single-parent
families, an extended family, interracial families, animal
families, a family without children, and ... a family with two
dads and a family with two moms." 69
The Diversity Book Bag was brought home in January
2005, 70 which was over a year after the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts had held that the state's same-sex marriage
ban violated state constitutional guarantees. 71 Yet, as the First
Circuit noted, the book did not mention anything about samesex marriage, 72 so it was not as if Massachusetts's recognition
of same-sex unions would somehow have been a necessary
condition for a discussion of families involving parents of the
same sex. Indeed, Massachusetts had recognized that two
adults of the same sex could each be the legal parent of the
same child a decade before Goodridge v. Department of Public
Health was decided. 73 Thus, the information that was
presented in this Book Bag might have been presented even
before Massachusetts had begun formal recognition of samesex marnages.
Consider a state that does not afford legal recognition to
same-sex unions and, further, does not permit two individuals
of the same sex to become the legal parents of the same child.
Would it make sense to have the Diversity Book Bag be part of
the curriculum in such a state?
Elementary education serves a variety of goals, 74 including
promoting good citizenship 75 and learning how to get along

68. ld. at 92.
69. Id.
70. Jd.
71. ld. ("On November 18, 20Ui3, a divided Supreme ,Judicial Court of
Massachusetts held, in Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.K2d 941 (Mass.
2003), that the state constitution mandates the recognition of same-sex marriage.").
72. ld. at 92.
73. See Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d :n5, 321 (Mass. 1993) (holding that each
member of a same-sex couple can be the legal parent of the same child).
74. Walz ex rel. Walz v. Egg Harbor Twp. Bd. of Educ., :H2 F.3d 271, 275-76 (3d
Cir. 2003) ("Elementary schools arc responsible for teaching young children basic
social, behavioral, and academic lessons in a structured environment.").
75. West Va. State Dd. of Educ. v. Barnette, :l19 U.S. 624, 6:17 (191:i) (states "are
educating the young for citizenship").
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better with others.7 6 But getting along well with others may
well be facilitated when one learns that other children live in
families unlike one's own, whether those families involve one
parent, two parents of different races or religions, or two
parents of the same sex. Further, it should be noted that even a
state that does not permit second-parent adoptions within the
jurisdiction would still have to recognize such a final adoption
that had been validly performed in a sister state. 77 This means
that one child might have two legal parents of the same sex in
any state of the union, for example, because the parents
established their legal relationship with their child in one state
but then moved to another. For example, Oklahoma does not
allow two individuals of the same sex to adopt a child. 78
However, two members of a same-sex couple who adopt a child
in California and then move to Oklahoma would have their
legal relationships with the child recognized, notwithstanding
that such an adoption could not have been performed within
the state. 79
Suppose that the law were different and that states were
not required by the Full Faith and Credit Clause to recognize
adoptions finalized in other states. Even so, that would not
obviate the desirability of having schoolchildren realize that
some of their classmates may live in family settings unlike
their own. Nor would it obviate the desirability of having
children in alternative family settings realize that they are not
alone and that others live in nontraditional families.
The Diversity Book Bag was not offering a legal definition
of family, as is evidenced by its referring to animal families.

76. Cf. .John T. Berry, A Check-Up on the Health of the Legal Profession, 17 PROF.
LAW. 1, 2 (2006) (discussing a judge who guessed that "the lawyers in this case did not
attend kindergarten, as they never learned how to get along well with others").
77. See Finstucn v. Crutcher, 496 F.3d 11::39, 1141 (lOth Cir. 2007) ("We hold that
final adoption orders by a state court of competent jurisdiction are judgments that
must be given full faith and credit under the Constitution by every other state in the
nation.").
78. See id. at 1149 ("[tjhe statute, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 750::3-1.1 (West
2009), categorically denies unmarried couples eligibility to adopt a child."). Oklahoma
docs not allow same-sex couples to marry. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 4::3, § ::l(A) (West
2009) ("Any unmarried person who is at least eighteen (18) years of age and not
otherwise disqualified is capable of contracting and consenting to marriage with a
person of the opposite sex.").
79. See Finstuen. 496 F.::ld at 1156 ("We hold today that final adoption orders and
decrees are judgments that are entitled to recognition by all other states under the Full
Faith and Credit Clause.").
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But in that event, inclusion of these families in a book does not
imply that the state affords such families legal recognition. Nor
does it imply that the state is offering an endorsement of these
families. Rather, inclusion merely involves an acknowledgment
that such families exist. If one of the goals of the schools is to
teach children that there are many types of family settings,
then children should be presented with a wide assortment of
households, some but not others containing children and some
but not others that are afforded formal legal recognition.
Many commentators bemoan the breakdown of the family, 80
worrying that the great number of single parents bodes poorly
for society. 81 Yet, presumably, inclusion of single-parent
families within the families in the Diversity Book Bag should
not be criticized as an endorsement of single-parent
households. Rather, it should be understood as a
representation of one kind of family. Further, refusing to
recognize that alternative families exist would be to ignore an
important demographic fact, 82 even if these alternative living
arrangements are not in accord with a particular religious
ideal. 83
80. See, e.g., Kent W. Bartholomew, The Definition of "Family" in Missouri Local
Zoning Ordinances: An Analysis of the Justifications for Restrictive Definitions, 52 ST.
LOUTS U. L.J. 631, 662 (2008) (noting that "the breakdown of the traditional family has
been identified as one of the root causes of violence among children"); Randall T.
Shepard, Why the Courts Matter in Building a Strong Economy, 36 IND. L. REV. 91:J,
914 (2003) ("Many of the social problems that have plagued American society arc
caused by the breakdown of families."); Amy L. Wax, Engines of Inequality: Class,
Race, and fi'amily Structure, 41 FAM. L.Q. 567, 597 (2007) ("'Governments cannot easily
alleviate the harms that flow from the breakdown of the nuclear family.").
81. Cf. June Carbone, Review Essay, Is Fertility the Unspoken Issue in the Debate
between Liberal and Conservative Family Values? :12 LAW & Soc. IN<~UII{Y 809, 818
(2007) ("The goal should accordingly he to discourage single-parent families."); Sherrine
M. Walker & Christopher D. Wall, Feminist Jurisprudence: Justice and Care, 11 BYU
J. PUB. L. 255, 272 (1997) ("Many are willing to argue that single parent families are
the single largest cause of the breakdown of society.").
82. See, e.g., Jessica R. Feinberg, Friends as Co-Parents, 4il U.S.F. L. REV. 799,
805 (2009) ("The percentage of single parent households increased from 9% of all
households in 1990 to 16% in 2000.").
S:J. Some commentators seem to forget that the claimed right is an exemption
from exposure to religiously objectionable lifestyles, which might include a whole host
of arrangements involving individuals of the same sex or of different sexes. lt thus
simply will not do as an answer to point out that many of the alternative living
arrangements involve different-sex couples, as if that justifies making a special
exemption for LGI3T families even though many families would he found religiously
unacceptable. See Charles J. Russo, Same-Sex Marriage and Public School Curricula:
Preserving Parental Ri[Jhts to Direct the Education of Their Children, i32 U. DAYTON L.
REV. 361, :166---67 (2007) ("This essay parries these objections by pointing out that as
regrettable as developments with regard to marriage and alternative living
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Consider a particular tradition that does not approve of
divorce. It would be a disservice to all concerned to refuse to
acknowledge that many households contain children living
with a divorced parent, even if some religious traditions
disapprove of divorce. Or, suppose that a particular religion
disapproves of religious intermarriage. Would this mean that
an elementary school teacher should consider carefully whether
to mention the marriage of Chelsea Clinton and Marc
Mezvinsky if that wedding were somehow relevant on a
particular day? 84
Presumably, one of the reasons that these different types of
families were included in the Diversity Book Bag was to
reassure children who were living in nontraditional families.
Consider a different book in the first grade curriculum, to
which parents objected, Molly's Family, which was about a girl
who was teased because she had two mothers. 85 Eventually,
she learns to feel better about herself and her family once she
appreciates that there are many different types of families. 86
But developing an appreciation that there are many types of
families and that one should not feel ashamed for living in an
unusual family might be helpful for any number of children.
For example, children living in a very religiously conservative
family might come to appreciate that they are not somehow
wrong or bad for being raised in a setting that does not mirror
the setting of many of their classmates.
Other plaintiffs objected to the reading of King and King, in
which one prince falls in love with another. 87 The Wirthlins did
not want that book read to their second grader, and wanted
advance notice of what books would be covered so that they
could have their child exempted when the material would
contravene their religious beliefs. 88 It might be helpful to flesh
arrangements are, they are still, by-and-large, taking place within the context of
heterosexual, rather than homosexual, liaisons.").
81. See For Quiet Bride, Dress Speaks Volumes, WATERLOO REGION REC., Aug. 3,
2010, at D6, available at 2010 WLNR 15397005 ("The ceremony was conducted by a
rabbi and a reverend as Chelsea Clinton is Methodist and Mezvinsky is Jewish.").
85. See Parker, 511 F.3d 87, 93 (1st Cir. 2008) ("When Jacob entered first grade
that fall, his classroom's book collection included ... Molly:~ Family, a picture book
about a girl who is at first made to feel embarrassed by a classmate because she has
both a mommy and a mama but then learns that families can come in many different
varieties.").
86. /d.
87. /d.
88. /d. at 102.
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out what it would mean for the state to be asserting something
that contravenes one's religious beliefs. Presumably, it does not
violate the Wirthlins' religious beliefs for the state to say that
some jurisdictions or religious traditions recognize same-sex
marriage, 89 even if the Wirthlins' religious tradition does not.
Suppose that a particular religion does not approve of
interracial marriage 90 or, perhaps, does not approve of religious
intermarriage. 91 Presumably, mentioning that such couples
exist would not contravene those religious beliefs, even if the
religion at issue would not recognize the marriages. Or,
suppose that a particular religion believes in the importance of
following the Biblical command to be fruitful and multiplyY 2
Presumably, it does not contravene religious beliefs to mention
that there are childless couples or that some individuals
voluntarily choose not to have children, even if the religion
advocates having children.
A separate question involves whether legitimate
pedagogical interests are served by mentioning diverse families
more generally, or families involving same-sex parents in
particular. The Parker court noted that the state has an
interest in promoting tolerance, 93 mentioning "the role of public
education in the preparation of students for citizenship." 94
Thus, the inclusion was designed to further legitimate state
objectives, and there was no evidence that the discussion of this
vast array of types of families was included as a subtle or notso-subtle attempt to undermine the teachings of a particular
religious group.

89. Jamal Greene, Comment, Divorcing Marriage from Procreation, 111 YALE L.J.
1989, 1995 (2005) ("Although many religions do not recognize same-sex marriage,
many others do.").
90. See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 571, 580 (198il) ("Bob
Jones University is not affiliated with any religious denomination, but is dedicated to
the teaching and propagation of its fundamentalist Christian religious beliefs .... The
sponsors of the University genuinely believe that the Bible forbids interracial dating
and marriage.").
91. Zvi H. Triger, The Gendered Racial Formation: Foreign Men, "Our" Women,
and the Law, 30 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 179, 479 (2009) (discussing the "ancient
proscription against intermarriage, based on a broad range of prohibitions against
mixing religion, race, status, nationality and so forth, is common to numerous societies
and religions that have thrived at different times and in various places").
92. See Holmes Rolston Ill, Essay, Saving Creation: Faith Shaping
Environmental Policy, 4 HARV. L. & POL'Y ReN. 121, 117 (2010) ("'n Genesis 1:22, God
says, more simply: "Be fruitful and multiply.'').
93. Parker, 514 F.iid at 95.
94. !d.
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Merely because the state believes that valid interests are
served by informing children about the different kinds of
families living in the state or the country does not mean that
parents will agree with that assessment. As the First Circuit
noted, parents might choose not to send their children to public
schools, instead opting to send their children to private schools
or, as a different court noted, to do home-schooling. 95 However,
those parents deciding to send their children to the public
schools do not have a constitutional right to direct schools in
how to educate their own or others' children. 96 Nor do the
parents have a constitutional right to decide that their children
will attend public school part-time, for example, to receive
instruction in only certain specified subjects, if such an option
is not afforded as a general matter by the school. 97
Were parents to have a right to determine the content of
the curriculum, many public schools would simply be unable to
operate. Parents might disagree both about curricular content
and about the amount of class time that should be spent on
particular topics. In many cases, it would be impossible to
satisfy the competing desires of interested parents. Further,
even if it were possible to meet the different parental demands,
designing the curriculum to meet the various desires
articulated by the parents might yield a curriculum that could
not be defended pedagogically.
To assess the merits of the plaintiffs' claim, the First
Circuit first sought to determine the kind of harm that the
plaintiffs had suffered. As had been true in Mozert, there was

95. !d. at 102. See also Swanson ex rei Swanson v. Guthrie Indcp. Sch. Dist., 135
F.3d 694, 698 (1Oth Cir. 1998) ("The policy docs not prohibit them from home-schooling
Annie in accordance with their religious beliefs, and docs not force them to do anything
that is contrary to those beliefs.").
96. Parher, 514 F.3d at 102. See also Fields v. l'almdale Sch. Dist., 427 F.3d 1197,
1206 (9th Cir. 2005) ("[O]ncc parents make the choice as to which school their children
will attend, their fundamental right to control the education of their children is, at the
least, substantially diminished. The constitution docs not vest parents with the
authority to interfere with a public school's decision as to how it will provide
information to its students or what information it will provide, in its classrooms or
otherwise.").
97. Swanson, 135 F.ild at 702 ("Despite Plaintiffs' arguments to the contrary,
what they seck in this case is special treatment not afforded other home-schooled or
private-schooled students. They seek an added exception to the part-time attendance
policy, that would accommodate people who home-school for religious reasons. Nothing
in the Free Exercise Clause requires that such special treatment be provided.").
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no allegation of coercion in Parker. 98 Nor was there any
allegation, for example, that listening to the teacher read King
and King, or any of the other books that the parents objected to
being read, somehow violated Joseph Wirthlin's religious
duties. 99 Further, it was not as if Joseph's having been read to
in school would somehow prevent his parents from instructing
him in a way that was more in keeping with their beliefs. 100
While the First Circuit was willing to accept the plaintiffs'
assertion that "the reading of King and King was precisely
intended to influence the listening children toward tolerance of
gay marriage," 101 the court rejected that the reading involved
an "attempt to indoctrinate." 102 Indeed, the court suggested
that requiring a student to read a book, without more, would
generally not be enough to constitute religious coercion. 103
Something more would be required to establish a constitutional
violation, for example, forcing the student to affirm those
ideas. 104
So, too, merely because two books were made available to
Jacob Parker to which his parents had religious objections did
not suffice to prove a free exercise violation. Indeed, Jacob was
required neither to read the books nor have them read to
him. 105 Further, when one considers that the books did not
"endorse gay marriage or homosexuality, or even address these
topics explicitly, but merely describe[d] how other children
might come from families that look different from one's own," 106
it was difficult to see how this would involve a free exercise

98. Parker, 514 F.3d at 105 ("The parents do not allege coercion in the form of a
direct interference with their religious beliefs, nor of compulsion in the form of
punishment for their beliefs.").
99. ld.
100. Id. ("[Tjhe mere fact that a child is exposed on occasion in public school to a
concept offensive to a parent's religious belief does not inhibit the parent from
instructing the child differently."). See also Fields, 427 F.:Jd at 1200 ("['!']here is no
fundamental right of parents to be the exclusive provider of information regarding
sexual matters to their children, either independent of their right to direct the
upbringing and education of their children or encompassed by it. We also hold that
parents have no due process or privacy right to override the determinations of public
schools as to the information to which their children will be exposed while enrolled as
students.").
101. Parker, 514 F.ad at 106.
102. ld.
103. Id.
104. ld.
105. Id.
106. ld.
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violation. Thus, there was some question whether the plaintiffs
had suffered a cognizable harm.
When the state describes the family settings that exist, it is
acknowledging but not necessarily legitimizing those
families. 107 There is something rather unsettling in implicitly if
not explicitly suggesting that various types of families should
not even be mentioned unless they have the requisite religious
approval. While individuals are free to believe according to
their own lights, 108 those beliefs should not determine who is
even acknowledged to exist.
There is also something unsettling in suggesting that the
contents of the curriculum should be determined by the
taxpayers in the community or the parents of children in the
schools, as if the subject matters should be chosen by a vote
during a Parent Teacher Association meeting. 109 If students
are going to be able to thrive in this world, they are going to
have to be able to work with people both like and unlike
themselves. Pretending that whole segments of society do not
exist will help no one, even if those segments of society are not
popular locally.
Certainly, many of the parents who were challenging what
was being taught in their children's school were not
challenging the subject per se by saying that it simply should
not be included in the curriculum, 110 but were instead
suggesting that they did not want their children exposed to the
subjects. 111 Yet, such a request is more difficult to grant than
might first appear. 112 Suppose, for example, that a child were

107. Some commentators do not seem to appreciate this. See Russo. supra note 83,
at :371 (discussing "teaching that essentially legitimizes same-sex marriage by
presenting it as one of an array of familial alternatives").
108. See Emp't Div. v. Smith, 1\94 U.S. 872, 877 (1990) ("The free exercise of
religion means, first and foremost, the right to believe and profess whatever religious
doctrine one desires.").
109. Cf. Russo, supra note 83, at il79 (suggesting that "educational leaders and
hoards should focus on input from their real stakeholders-parents and community
members").
110. Parker, 514 F.8d at 102 ("Plaintiffs specifically disclaim any intent to seek
control of the school's curriculum or to impose their will on others. They do not seek to
change the choice of books available to others.").
111. /d.
112. Some commentators do not seem to appreciate some of the difficulties that
might be entail(~d. See Eric A. DeGroff, Parental Rights and Public School Curricula:
Revisiting Mozert after 20 Years, 38 .J.L. & Euuc. 83, 96 (2009) ("Parents should,
therefore, be extended the right to exempt their children from curricular requirements
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excused from reading about the different types of families that
exist. Even so, during a different part of the day, one student
might refer to readings or a discussion from an earlier part of
the day or, perhaps, from the previous week. It might be quite
difficult to prevent the religious child from being exposed to
these "objectionable" ideas. Further, parents might object to a
whole host of subjects that might yield understandings
contrary to faith, which would both make it very difficult to
anticipate when the topics would be raised. And, even if
possible to anticipate, might mean that the children would be
exempted from a significant percentage of class activities. 113
While it might seem that exemptions would only affect the
students who would be excused from certain activities, it is
plausible to think that the effect would be more widespread.
Consider a teacher who wants to discuss or refer to something
in the afternoon that had been covered earlier in the day.
Suppose that this teaching moment involved a sensitive subject
matter for at least some of the students in the room. The
teacher would have to decide whether to excuse the students
for a few moments while making the reference or engaging in a
limited discussion. It would be unsurprising if the teacher
would decide simply not to discuss the issue rather than spend
extra class time excusing particular students and then
arranging to have them return to the class.
At least two difficulties are suggested by the scenario, in
which the teacher forgoes saying or doing something that she
believes would be pedagogically useful because she might
otherwise have to take class time to excuse particular students.
First, it might mean that the curriculum could in effect be
controlled by those who want their children excused, which
might mean that particular subject areas would be much less
likely to be addressed in class. 114 Second, it should not be
thought that very few discrete areas would be subject to this

in the public schools, at least when their objections are prompted by religious or moral
convictions.").
113. See Emily J. Brown, Note, When Insiders Become Outsiders: Parental
Objections to Public School Sex J<;ducation Programs, 59 DUKE L.J. 109, 11il (2009)
(suggesting that Parker illustrates the practical problems posed when parents object
"to the general worldview promulgated by a public sehoul curriculum").
111. Ironically, some commentators complain that including the subject matter in
the first place somehow involves use of a heckler's veto, see Russo, supra note 8:3, at
:no, whereas it is much more plausible to suggest that refusing to discuss the material
involves deference to such a veto.
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reduced coverage as a brief consideration of some of these cases
reveals.
Some parents have articulated religious objections to classic
children's authors such as A.A. Milne, Dr. Seuss, and Maurice
Sendak. 115 But this might mean that Charlotte's Web 116 or
Winnie the Pooh 117 would be materials that might be avoided
either on the reading list or, perhaps, in later discussions.
Would students be able to get an education even if these
materials were not included? Yes. Would their educations be
diminished if these and other works were excluded because
some parents found the content religiously objectionable? Yes.
Some commentators imply that books like Diversity Book
Bag, Molly's Family, and King and King are being foisted on
the schools by "a small number of activists attempting to
change the nature and meaning of marriage." 118 It is especially
ironic that such a claim would be made in the context of an
analysis of Parker. The first two of those books did not even
discuss marriage, so it is difficult to see how those books could
fairly be characterized as seeking to foist this allegedly foreign
concept on unsuspecting children. Even King v. King was read
in a state that already recognized same-sex marriage, so it
could hardly be fairly described as attempting to subvert the
state's definition or understanding of marriage.
Suppose, however, that we were talking about a state in
which same-sex marriage was not recognized. Even so, it must
be remembered that this was a fairy tale. Many things happen
in fairy tales that not only will not occur locally but are
physically impossible. Yet, same-sex marriage is recognized in
various states and countries, even if it is not (yet) recognized in
the particular state where a book is being read. It would be at
best an unusual educational principle that precluded
discussion of anything that was not legally recognized within a
particular state.
Regrettably, some commentators seek to justify excluding
certain books or subjects because those books present a picture
of the world that the commentators reject, empirical evidence
undermining the commentators' v1ews notwithstanding.

115. See Fleischfresser v. Dirs. of Sch. Dist. 200, 15 F.3d 680, 688 (7th Cir. 1994).
116. E. B. WHITE, CHARLOTTE'S WEB (1952).
117. A. A. MILN~:, WINNIE THE POOH (1926).
118. Russo, supra note 8il, at 370.
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Consider the claim that "the co-parenting message of marriage
is weakened when marriage is redefined to include relations
among same-sex couples that are designed for sexual pleasure
and lack the ability to co-parent." 119 Yet, it is difficult to see
how the co-parenting message is undermined by couples who
not only do not lack the ability to co- parent, but are in fact coparenting. Indeed, various studies suggest that same-sex
couples are parenting quite well. 120
Several of the plaintiffs in Goodridge were same-sex couples
living with their minor children. 121 To say that they could not
co-parent is simply wrong. It seems safe to assume that some
parents do not approve of the message sent in the Diversity
Book Bag, not because of the message's falsity but because of
its truth. LGBT families exist and are thriving, even if certain
religious groups disapprove of them.
Certainly, commentators might note that members of a
same-sex married couple cannot each be biologically related to
the same child. But we have long ago rejected that marriage
should only be for individuals who can have a child through
their union, and numerous couples both of the same sex and of
different sexes find themselves parenting children to whom
they have no biological connection. If this is somehow
destructive of the basic understanding of marriage, then
marriage is in serious trouble.
It is at best ironic that commentators seem to believe samesex married couples who are raising their children do more to
sever the link between marriage and parenting than do
heterosexual married couples who choose not to have children.
The claim here of course is not that voluntarily childless
couples should not be able to marry but merely that some of the
arguments offered against same-sex couples seem much more
persuasive when applied to other groups. But this suggests
that even more groups are at risk of being marginalized by

119. Lynn D. Wardle, The Attach on Marriage as the Union of a Man and a
Woman, 83 N.D. L. REV. 1365, 1377 (20(l7).
120. See e.g., U. Va. Study: Adoptive Children of Lesbian and Gay Couples
Developing Well, DAILY NEWS LEADER, ,July 26, 2010, available at 2010 WLNR
1191797:-l (discussing a study finding "that whether or not adoptive children were
developing in positive ways was unrelated to the sexual orientation of their adoptive
parents").
121. Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 949 (Mass. 200:3)
(describing several same-sex couples raising minor children).
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continuing efforts to restrict school discussions to those
promoting a particular viewpoint.

III. CONCLUSION
How should a school's curriculum be affected by a state's
deciding to recognize same-sex marriage? As a general matter,
it should not make much difference. It is too late in the day to
treat same-sex marriage as if it was a contradiction in terms. 122
Whether or not same-sex marriage is recognized in one state
should not affect whether the topic can be mentioned. Indeed,
unless there can be general agreement that mentioning a topic,
without more, cannot be construed as endorsing a particular
view, children will be at risk of being given a woefully
inadequate education because so many subjects would be
objectionable as endorsements.
As Parker and Mozert illustrate, parents may have religious
objections to subjects involving legally permissible or even
recognized relationships or activities. Figuring out how to
acknowledge the existence of LGBT families without burdening
free exercise may involve difficult line-drawing in some cases.
However, for the most part, whether a particular state
recogmzes same-sex relationships should not determine
whether the existence of such relationships should be
acknowledged, and the claim that it should, imposes a litmus
test that would normally never be imposed. Children should be
taught in age-appropriate ways about the world in which they
live, and their exposure to the world should not be limited to
those subjects that have been given a religious stamp of
approval.

122. See Vanessa A. Lavely, Comment, The Path to Recognition of Same-Sex
Marriage: Reconciling the Inconsistencies between Marriage and Adoption Cases, 55
UCLA L. REV. 217, 271 (2007) ("When same-sex couples first began to petition for
marriage licenses, for example, some state officials simply denied the possibility of
same-sex
marriage,
describing
it
as
a
'contradiction
m
terms."').

